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1. Background 
 
 
This chapter will look at the value individuals place on travel time savings. This is a 
surprisingly important topic because time savings form a very large part of user 
benefits identified in most transport schemes, and transport schemes are themselves 
very expensive. It is therefore sensible to spend larger sums on accurately identifying 
the value of travel time savings (VTTS) than many firms‟ total market research 
budgets. Given that level of spending, it is crucially important that the underlying 
theory is well understood. 
 
It is important to realise from the beginning that VTTS values are required for two 
distinct purposes, and can be different depending on purpose. The first use is in 
determining the effect of policies on the ground. If a toll road scheme is to be 
implemented that saves 15 minutes for drivers currently making an equivalent end-to-
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end journey, but at a charge of 5 Euros a time, we need to know roughly how many 
drivers will switch to the tolled road. We say this is a forecasting value, or 
Willingness To Pay (WTP) value. 
 
Quite separately from that, we need VTTS values for valuing time savings (and 
losses) that arise due to a scheme. These values should represent the public benefit 
from saving travellers‟ time. It is sensible that they should reflect WTP values, but if 
the public wants to take account of need then we must adjust for the fact that some 
people have more money to spend than others and so have a higher WTP for a given 
level of need. We shall see (in section 5) that when projects are being paid for 
(directly or indirectly) out of public funds we need to use an Equity Value of Time. 
This will prevent us from tending to build new roads in the richer parts of the country, 
for example. 
 
This chapter begins by, very gently, setting out the underpinning of VTTS by 
economic theory. It is a simplified exposition that should appeal to those who have 
had difficulty with other expositions. Hardly any assumptions need to be made. In 
section 3, we look at how travellers respond to time savings and losses. The chapter 
then looks briefly at the survey methods used to determine VTTS for a population. 
Section 5 looks at the theory on why we use Equity Values when paying for time 
savings with public funds. Sections 6 and 7 briefly look at the contentious issues of 
treating time losses differently to time savings, and treating small time changes 
differently to large time changes. Section 8 looks at the special case of time savings 
that arise in the course of paid employment.   
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2. Neo-classical economic theory underpinning 
  
 The purpose of this section is to give a simplified theoretical underpinning to valuing 
travel time savings. If successful, readers should find they need to make no strange 
assumptions, and should feel that the theory is working for them. This should mean 
that they will be more accepting of the results derived and more able to see how the 
range of topics touched on in this chapter form a whole, and are well supported by 
conventional economic theory. 
 
 This is not to say that the conventional theoretical underpinning of VTTS is rejected, 
merely that having been demonstrated elsewhere to everyone‟s satisfaction, 
something simpler and more useful will suffice here. Neither shall we review all the 
attempts at theoretical underpinning, some of which may have been very similar to 
that presented here, but we say clearly that a debt is owed to Becker (1965), De Serpa 
(1971, 1973),  Bruzelius (1979), Truong and Hensher (1985), and Bates (1987, or his 
chapter 3 in MVA/ITS/TSU, 1987). Readers wanting a more rigorous approach 
should look to those places. 
 
 In the simple approach presented here, we shall assume that individuals seek to 
maximise their Happiness or Satisfaction with life, conventionally called Utility (U). 
This latter is here taken to depend on consumption of goods and services Xi                
(i=1, …, I) and the hours of time, tj,  they devote to various activities j = 1, …, J. Of 
these activities, we will say that activity 1 is travelling, and activity 2 is working (for 
payment of wage w per hour). For any combination of activities there will be an 
associated minimum travel time, k. Note that spending longer in an activity (eg. work) 
does not necessarily mean that you need to spend longer travelling to and from that 
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activity. Also, in the same way that each day must have exactly 24 hours in it, so any 
time period we work with must have exactly T hours. Goods and services (i) have 
prices pi, and individuals can take an amount S from unearned or previously saved 
income (or save  – S) to balance their budget over the period. 
 
 In mathematical terms we have: 
 
 MAX  U(Xi, tj) i = 1, …, I,  j = 1, …, J 
 
 SUBJECT TO  wt2  +  S  =  piXi  (wages + savings = expenditure) 
 
    T  =  tj  (we are always doing something) 
 
    t1    k   (our activities need at least k travel time) 
 
  
 This last constraint is an inequality, which is helpful as all the theory of linear 
programming (particularly the Kuhn-Tucker conditions) are available should we need 
them, but will for now be sidestepped in this simplified presentation by assuming that 
we each have a fixed amount of non-essential travel time, n, possibly zero but 
definitely not negative. The third constraint then becomes: 
    t1  =   k  +  n 
 
 We are still linear programming since the Xi, tj, pi, w, T, S, n and k must all be 
positive, but that is commonplace and we can proceed to form a standard Lagrangian 
Multiplier, L, to maximise, as: 
 L  =   U(Xi, tj)  +  λ(wt2  +  S  -  piXi)  +  µ(T  -  tj)  +  θ(t1  -   k  -  n)              (1) 
 
 The Lagrangrian has incorporated the 3 constraints, as though the 3 bracketed terms 
are all „zeros‟ multiplied by symbols that have the following interpretations: 
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 λ is the marginal utility of relaxing the budget constraint, effectively the „marginal 
utility of income‟, which will always be positive; 
 
 µ is the marginal utility of relaxing the time budget, sometimes referred to as the 
„resource value of time‟, which should never be negative; 
 
 θ is the marginal utility of having to spend more time travelling, which may be 
positive (in the case of a pleasure boat ride) but which is usually negative since 
travelling is usually less pleasurable than spending time in one of activities 3 to J.  
 
 Note that if we had more than one mode of transport, or varying conditions on a 
single mode of transport (say due to varying levels of crowding on public transport, or 
varying levels of congestion when driving) then we would have to specify a range of 
θs, and talk of the marginal disutility of travel in that particular circumstance. 
 
 Clearly, given our constraints, L = U, and we can proceed to take the first step (and 
our only step) along the path to maximising U by investigating the first order 
conditions obtained by differentiating L partially with respect to interesting variables, 
and setting each equal partial derivative to zero. 
  
            
iX
L


 =  
iX
U


    -  λpi    =  0  i = 1, …, I             (2) 
 
 
1t
L


  =  
1t
U


  -  µ  +  θ   =  0                 (3) 
 
 
2t
L


  =  
2t
U


  +  λw  -  µ   =  0      (4) 
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jt
L


  =  
jt
U


  -  µ    =  0  j = 3, …, J              (5) 
 
 
 
 The source of a very high proportion of the errors that occur in mathematical 
Transport Economics arise due to failure to check the second order conditions. 
However, the present case has been well studied, and it is indeed a maximum. Let us 
look carefully at first order conditions (2) to (5), starting with (5). This just says that 
 
 
jt
U


  =  µ  j = 3, …, J                   (6)
  
 which means that, for time uses other than travel and work, individuals should seek to 
equate the marginal utility of time spent in each activity. The value, µ, to which they 
are equated to, represents the utility gained by having a little more time available for 
use in one of these activities, or the utility lost by having a little less time available to 
spend in one of these activities. As we said above, it is sometimes referred to as the 
„resource value of time‟. 
 
 Moving back to condition (4), this says 
 
2t
U


  +   λw     =   µ                                 (7) 
 which says that, for the work activity, you should take account of the utility you gain 
from the wages before equating time spent at work with the resource value. Generally, 
the marginal utility of time spent at work will be negative, but the marginal utility of 
the wages (here equal to the marginal utility of income, λ, times the wages for that 
amount of time spent working) will more than offset that, bringing us back to µ. 
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 Eventually we get to travel, with condition (3), which says 
   
1t
U


  =   µ  -   θ         (8) 
 which says that the marginal utility of a travel time saving (MUTTS), measured in 
utils, is equal to the difference between µ and θ. The µ term says there are things we 
could be doing with that amount of time (the resource value) while the θ says how 
much utility is gained while travelling. Three cases might be looked at. Firstly, for a 
pleasure boat trip or a Sunday drive through stunning countryside, you might not like 
to hear that your journey time had been reduced. In those cases, θ would be positive 
and greater than µ and MUTTS will be negative. Secondly, you may gain some utility 
from travelling, but not as much as you would get from any of the activities 3 to J. In 
that case, θ will be positive but less than µ, and MUTTS will also be positive but less 
than µ. Thirdly, the travel time saved might be in unpleasant overcrowded public 
transport or in start-stop traffic on a heavily congested road. In those cases θ would be 
negative, and MUTTS greater than µ. 
 
 Lastly, we come to condition (2), which says 
 
iX
U


   =  λpi          (9) 
 which says that you should keep buying goods and services up to the point that the 
marginal utility of buying that unit is just equal to the utility represented by the price 
of that unit. That gives us most of microeconomic theory, so our exposition is plugged 
into that body of work. Here, prices p are expressed in money terms, and converted 
into utils by multiplying by the marginal utility of income, λ. 
 
 That trick also works in reverse, so we can obtain VTTS in money terms by dividing 
our expression for MUTTS in utils by λ. We had, in eqn. (8), 
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 MUTTS  =  
1t
U


  =   µ  -   θ   in utils, so 
 
 VTTS  =     (µ  -   θ)/λ    in money units                                 (10) 
 
 So, to conclude, we can say that VTTS is equal to the monetary value of time spent in 
an alternative activity less the monetary value of the travel time that has now 
disappeared. 
 
 
3. Possible responses to a travel time change 
 
 When travellers experience a speeding up or slowing down in the travel modes 
currently in their choice set they can react in a number of ways. At the margin, for 
small time changes there will be small time gains or losses if the currently chosen 
mode is affected, and the departure time may change. For bigger changes, travellers 
may decide to: 
 (i) use a different route; 
 (ii) use a different mode; 
 (iii) reschedule activities; 
 etc. 
 
 Modellers will typically try to form a Generalised Cost estimate for each possible 
choice. By Generalised Cost we mean a measure (usually stated) in money terms 
representing the disutility of each choice alternative. It can be thought of as the 
negative of a simple (usually linear)  Utility function. It is constructed by summing all 
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the elements already in money terms (eg. fares, petrol costs, parking costs, etc) and 
adding on elements of time each monetised by multiplying by an appropriate value of 
time, plus some fixed cost elements for such things as having to change trains etc.  
 
 For example, in-vehicle travel time (IVT) on each mode will have its own level of 
marginal disutility per unit of time, and so its own value of time (VIVT). If we set 
VIVT the same for each mode it is not saying that bus passengers have the same value 
of time as car passengers, say, but merely that a given traveller has the same value of 
time when moving between modes. More usually, VIVT will differ between modes, 
for a given traveller, due to differences in pleasantness of travel conditions. If 
observed IVTs were used for modelling, the lower incomes of bus passengers would 
give a lower bus VIVT than car VIVT, which would work to reduce bus GC relative 
to car GC and thereby allocate too many travellers to bus. In fact, an average traveller 
tends to have lower VIVT in their own car, where they have considerable control over 
conditions, than for bus, which is usually held to be at the low end of comfort and 
ambience. VIVT values within mode are sometimes related to how crowded the 
service is (or how crowded the roads are), possibly turning them into a non-linear 
function.  
 
 Another example is „out of vehicle time‟, which may be further subdivided into 
„walk‟ and „wait‟ time, with their separate values of time, usually 1.5 to 3 times 
VIVT. Then we have „rescheduling time‟, which can be thought of as a penalty for 
not being able to depart exactly when you would want to. Again we might have a 
single monetary value for each minute you are away from your preferred time, or we 
may have functions of that amount of departure time adjustment, possibly with greater 
penalties for having to start out earlier rather than later, or vice versa. 
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 Particularly complicated is „reliability‟, which is important for travellers but which 
can be measured in many ways. One possibility is to estimate a monetary value for a 
one minute change to the standard deviation of travel times. Instead, we might choose 
to estimate a monetary value for an extra minute of „journey time spread‟, measured 
from the scheduled arrival time up to the 98
th
 percentile of arrival times. The purpose 
here is to try to distinguish between changes in „scheduled journey time‟, which can 
generally be prepared for prior to travel, and changes in „actual journey times‟, which 
are not so easily predicted and represent uncertainty prior to travel. We can think of 
the value of changes in scheduled journey time, where the traveller is free to replan 
their trip and possibly set out earlier, as a long term value. Conversely, if there are 
unexpected delays once the journey has started then only short term stratagems are 
available, and „starting out earlier‟ is not one of them.   
 
 It is sometimes helpful to consider Figure 1, which appears in a variety of forms          
in many places. It can be used in many ways, and so is very difficult to label. It 
describes the excess disutility of departing at non-ideal times. The horizontal axis is 
the departure time. The ideal time is marked as TB, at which (excess) disutility is 
shown as zero. Having to depart earlier than TB causes increasing disutility. Imagine 
the morning commute, where having to leave earlier than the ideal time means less 
time in bed, or disrupts the „school run‟. Departing later than TB at first causes gently 
increasing disutility as „slack‟ or safety margins in the schedule are used up (from TB 
to TC), followed by rapidly rising disutility as appointments are missed etc.  Having 
to depart after TD voids the purpose of the trip. Any action that has an equivalent 
effect as a change in departure time will cause an equivalent change in utility. 
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Figure 1. An Illustration of the Total Disutility (to all parties combined) associated with 
different departure times, with journey time known and zero variability  
  
 
 
 The distinction between short run and long run now becomes clear. In the short run, 
when the journey has begun, any delay will be equivalent to starting out later. High 
values of time are likely to result as penalties for late arrival build up quickly. The 
long term response to an increase in unreliability will therefore be to set out earlier so 
as to build more slack time into the schedule. Similarly, if a longer journey time is 
scheduled, the traveller will choose to start out earlier. They will probably wish to 
preserve the slack time (TB to TC) to protect against unreliability, and the shallower 
slope between TA and TB will always win out over the penal slope from TC to TD. 
 The slope from TA to TB is therefore the „resource value of time‟, µ, defined in 
section 2 above. In all these cases the disutility of the actual travelling time is 
additional, being equal to θ times hours spent travelling (not shown in Fig. 1). Being 
able to start out earlier presupposes the longer journey time is known about in 
TA TB TC TD 
 
 
Disutility 
Departure 
time 
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advance, referred to here as long run. This point is at the crux of difficulties in 
measuring the value of time in surveys, so we will next briefly consider that topic.   
 
 
 
4. Surveying to find estimates of the value of time 
 
 Building on the work of Samuelson (1953), the concept of Revealed Preference (RP) 
seeks to say things about individuals‟ preferences based on observed choice data. 
Usually only weak statements can be made about each individual, but if we assume 
we are dealing with a group of identically minded individuals each facing different 
choices then Willingness To Pay (WTP) values for the group can often be determined.  
 
 Imagine a traveller from Leeds to Antwerp, who faces a choice between flying for 
200 Euros (return) taking 3 hours (each way, door to door) and taking the Channel 
Tunnel „Eurostar‟ rail service at 100 Euros but taking 8 hours. She may choose the 
plane, in which case we can infer that (if we assume IVT is valued equally for plane 
and train and that there is no Mode Specific Constant utility in favour of either mode) 
her VTTS in this case is at least 10 Euros per hour, since she has saved 10 hours 
travelling time on the round trip but has had to pay 100 Euros extra. 
 
 If everyone in the sample faced exactly the same choice, then questioning them would 
elicit the percentage with VTTS above 10 Euros per hour, but that space is unbounded 
and it is usually unwise to attempt to derive a VTTS for the group in those 
circumstances. If exactly 50% chose plane we might say that the group‟s VTTS was 
10 Euros per hour, but that is a rare special case. 
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 In Fowkes and Wardman (1988), following Fowkes (1985), the VTTS values at which 
 a respondent would be indifferent between two alternatives were referred to as 
 'Boundary Values', B. Each choice puts the respondent on one side or other of B.   
 
Consider the model: 
 mxmcm TIMECOSTU    (11) 
where COST is the monetary cost, and TIME is the travel time of mode m.  In the 
terminology of section 2, βx is MUTTS and  βx /βc is VTTS, and this is how values of 
time are usually calculated. 
 
We can now define a boundary relative valuation of TIME in terms of money as 
 
      1221: TIMETIMECOSTCOSTCOSTTIMEB   (12) 
 
 What we need in the sample is a wide range of Boundary Values, but this is not so 
easy to achieve as might be supposed. In many cases, the quicker mode is also the 
cheaper mode, so that no trade off exists, and nothing is learnt from observing the 
traveller to choose the quicker cheaper mode. Also, we usually find that alternatives 
have cost differences rising as time differences rise. Neither may be linear with 
distance (due to tapered fare scales and fixed access/egress times), and the 
relationship will not be exact, but it is usually serious enough to prevent the 
estimation of a satisfactory model. The 1980s UK Value of Time study 
(MVA/ITS/TSU, 1987) found a particularly good survey situation, for coach and train 
commuters from North Kent to London, where the coach stops and railway stations 
were sufficiently far apart that there was a good spread of journey time differences for 
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each cost difference. Even in that case, the overall VTTS was only estimated with an 
accuracy of +/- 33% (Fowkes, 1986), equivalent to a „t‟ score of 6. 
 
 That study therefore looked to find a better method of estimating VTTS, and settled 
on Stated Preference (SP). This was extremely influential for the acceptance of SP 
studies by the UK government and more widely. The method sounds unpromising. It 
consists of putting a range of hypothetical questions to potential and existing 
travellers. There are obviously worries about how reliable responses will be. 
However, by carefully choosing the questions to ask, and building up experience of 
studies over time, the method can be really useful. 
 
 Respondents are asked to choose between (or rank or rate) travel alternatives 
described by attributes set to various levels. The survey designer can choose the levels 
to ensure that each choice has a Boundary Value; in other words that it involves a 
trade-off. This alone makes the data richer than RP data. More importantly, though, 
each respondent can be asked to make several choices (at least 12), and each can have 
a different Boundary Value such that we can improve the accuracy of VTTS 
estimation quite easily. Provided respondents believe that they would actually have to 
pay the amounts stated in the questions to get the benefits shown, they should have no 
reason to attempt to deliberately bias the results.  
 
 Because the sort of errors that are made in SP experiments is different to those made 
in real life (and RP data), a rescaling is necessary before SP results can be used for 
forecasting.  For SP VTTS values themselves, however, being the ratio of identically 
scaled time and cost coefficients, the scaling cancels and there is no problem on that 
score.   
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 We saw in equation (10) that VTTS (via MUTTS) is made up of two parts, the 
resource value (from µ) and the utility of travelling (θ). A method for estimating these 
two component parts separately is proposed in Jara-Díaz and Guevara (2003). 
 
 
 
 
5. The use of Equity Values of Time 
 
 In appraisal work, we need VTTS figures to value time benefits and losses, but 
directly estimated Willingness To Pay values will not do, and the key arguments are 
not widely understood.  This section seeks to remedy that with a clear theoretical 
demonstration. It builds on results presented in Mackie, Jara-Díaz and Fowkes (2001), 
themselves developed from those in Jara-Díaz (1996) and Galvez and Jara-Díaz 
(1998). 
 
From the theory of cost benefit analysis (see Pearce and Nash, 1981, especially 
Chapter 3) we may define Social Welfare (Ws) as being some function of the utility, 
U, enjoyed by members of society, i.e. 
 
Ws = Ws (U1, U2, . . . Uq, . . . UQ)                 (13) 
 
where there are Q individuals or homogenous groups in society, and a particular 
individual or group will be denoted q. 
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Utility (measured in utils) is gained, all else equal, by purchasing amounts of goods 
and services, and this is constrained by individual generalised disposable income, Yq, 
and the set of prices in the economy, pi.  Hence we can write 
 
 Ws  =  Ws[U1 (Y1, pi), . . . Uq (Yq, pi), . . . UQ (YQ, pi)]                                            (14) 
 
We shall consider evaluating the case where individuals stand to receive travel time 
savings t1q , compared to some base „do-minimum‟ situation, for which they have to 
pay Fq (either through the fare box or as a contribution to public or private financing). 
 
We can write 
 


















q q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
q
s
q
s
t
F
F
Y
t
Y
Y
U
U
W
dt
dW
111
                             (15) 
 
Taking these terms one by one, describing them and labelling them: 
 
q
s
dt
dW
1
  is the rate of change of social welfare resulting from travel time changes dt1q 
 
q
s
U
W


 is the relative weight society places on the utility of group q when determining 
social welfare.  Following Jara-Díaz (1996) we denote it as q.  The sum of 
the q will be Q, and giving equal weight to all groups implies q = 1 for all 
q. 
 
 17 
q
q
Y
U


 is the marginal utility of income, for group q, and we will denote it as q   
 
q
q
t
Y
1

 is the equivalent income benefit for group q from the time savings t1q.  This is 
the willingness to pay of this group for those time savings.  We will denote it 
qWT P   
 
q
q
F
Y


 
  is the effect on the disposable income of group q of a change in the payment, 
Fq by that group.  Since the effect of a 1 Euro payment is equivalent to 1 Euro 
of lost income, this term is by definition equal to minus one. 
   
q
q
t
F
1

 is the charge per unit of time saving, which we will denote Cq.  
      
Substitution gives us 
qq
q
s dUdW      
q
qqqqq dtCWTP 1              (16) 
 
For a finite amount of time savings (t1q ) such as may arise from a transport scheme, 
we have 
 
 
qqq
q
qqs tCWTPW 1                                                                        (17) 
where WTPq and Cq are the correct average values relating to the change qt1  
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The welfare change SW  will be measured in utils.  To convert to monetary units we 
should divide by the average marginal utility of income in society.  We will denote 
this as s. 
 
  








q
qqq
s
q
q
s
s tCWTP
W
1



                           (18) 
 
We can calculate s  by weighting the group marginal utilities of income, q , by the 
utility weighting, q 
 
 qq
q
q
q
q
qq
s
Q



 





1
                              (19) 
 
We now consider, in turn: using WTP values;  using Equity values; and dealing with 
direct charges proportional to use. 
 
USING WTP  VALUES.  Firstly, following Galvez and Jara-Díaz (1998), we can 
look at the effect on welfare of valuing time savings by a particular group by their 
willingness to pay, in the case of a scheme financed from public funds.  The money 
value of social benefits (Bs , from time savings t1q) would then be 
 
 
q
qqs tWTPB 1                 (20) 
 
Again, each group would be charged some amount, Cq, per unit of time saved, now 
assumed to be raised indirectly such as through the tax system.  The utility impact of 
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this charge will be qqq tC 1    and the monetary value of the social welfare change 
would be  
 








q
qq
s
q
q
s
s tCWTP
W
1



                     (21) 
 
Equation (21) is only consistent with the theoretically derived equation (18) if  q  is 
set equal to s  for all q, i.e. if everyone had the same marginal utility of money.  In 
practice this is clearly not the case, and so we can reject equations and (20) and (21), 
along with the idea of valuing time savings of individuals by their Willingness to Pay 
when we are engaged in scheme evaluation and where the charges to be raised will be 
indirect (i.e. not directly related to use).  The effect of using uncorrected Willingness 
to Pay values to value time savings would be to favour schemes disproportionately 
favouring rich people, i.e. those with low marginal utility of income, q . 
 
USING EQUITY VALUES.  Secondly, let us consider using an „Equity‟ value of 
time, defined here to be a sort of average value of time determined by the democratic 
system, with all time savings being equally valued no matter as to whether they accrue 
to rich or poor.  The choice of a particular Equity value is clearly a political matter, 
but politicians may wish to be informed about what their voters are willing to pay.  
There would need to be special reasons for setting the Equity value much higher or 
lower than the values currently evinced by travellers.  Taking too high a value might 
lead to the construction of grandiose „white elephant‟ type schemes, whilst too low a 
value might lead to chronic congestion at a site where capacity might otherwise have 
been increased. 
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As a first approximation, we might suggest taking an average of current willingness to 
pay values as our Equity value, V.  Something of the sort has been U.K. practice for 
some time.  Discrete Choice Models are calibrated on Revealed Preference or Stated 
Preference data, and scaled coefficients of time, q , and cost, q , are estimated for 
groups (or occasionally individuals),  
 
Note that  q will be a scaled estimate of q , i.e. qq  . 
 
If the sample used has been taken randomly from traffic on the network in question, 
no weighting may be needed, but usually it is necessary to weight.  Willingness  to 
pay for individual groups can be found  
 
q
q
qWT P


                               (22) 
 
where the scaling is identical for the  and  and so cancels. 
 
Suppose we average over these WTP values in proportion to the mileage undertaken 
by each group, mq 
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and 
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It can be seen that eqn (25) is consistent with our theoretically derived equation (18) 
provided 
q  =  1                      q                 (26) 
and 
qWTPWTP q
s
q
m        )(


                            (27) 
or provided conditions (26) and (27) hold “on average”. 
 
In practice, it will usually be easier to find mileage weighted averages than travel time 
saving weighted averages, but they should not differ too much.  If we were to assume 
that group travel time savings were proportional to group mileages, then we could 
calculate a revised Vm using: 
 
qqq kmt  1                 (28) 
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                                                                                      (29) 
 
The measure, Vm, is similar to, but subtly different from, the mileage weighted 
willingness to pay measure proposed as equation (23). 
 
DIRECT CHARGES CASE.   Thirdly, we consider the case where direct 
charges are raised for the travel time savings. This does not just mean that the scheme 
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is paid for out of revenue to the operator, but specifically that the charge or fare is to 
be higher after the scheme is implemented than if the scheme had not been 
implemented. 
 
Initial inspection of equation (16) might leave one imagining that WTPq > Cq for all q, 
and so time savings will always add to social welfare.  This is not the case.  A 
government might construct a grandiose scheme, yielding minimal time savings (and 
no other benefits) for which the addition to taxes (e.g. per minute) was greatly in 
excess of the willingness to pay (WTPq per minute).  Another situation where it might 
occur is when time savings are only available as part of a package.  For example, if a 
slow cheap public transport facility were replaced by fast expensive one, some of the 
current passengers might not be willing to pay the fare increase, not valuing the time 
savings above the fare change.  However, they still have to keep travelling as they 
need to get to work.  This sort of thing is said to have happened when the Croydon 
Tramlink replaced lower fare buses to the New Addington council estate.   
 
If a scheme is to be fully funded by groups of users each paying a Cq that is less than 
or equal to their Willingness To Pay, WTPq , for the time savings involved, then these 
WTP values can safely be used to estimate benefits. If, however, there are some users 
not willing to buy the time savings at that cost, they will be disadvantaged by a 
reduction in Consumer Surplus (CS) if they need to use the new service. Care must be 
taken to include such CS losses, and not just the WTP values for these groups. 
 
In some cases, a proportion of scheme costs might need to be covered from public 
funds. In that case the time savings should be split in those same proportions. The 
proportion funded from direct charges should then be valued at the average WTP of 
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users (bearing in mind the point made in the previous paragraph). The remaining 
proportion should be valued at a either at the national Equity value, or at a local 
Equity value if local government money is used. 
 
 
6.       Appraising the valuations of gainers and losers 
 
It is sometimes suggested that user valuations for losses should be higher than for 
gains. The reasoning for this is that surveys often find greater value placed on a loss 
of something to the equivalent gain from that same starting position. Economists are 
predisposed by the Law of Diminishing Returns to expect that having more of 
something will have reducing value the more you already have have. However, that is 
to miss the point. It is true that we would all dislike losing 100 Euros more than we 
would value gaining 100 Euros, starting from a given position. If, however, you were 
first to lose 100 Euros, you would surely value regaining those 100 Euros the same as 
the original loss. After all, you have ended up at the same point you started. We are 
paying out and receiving money most days, and it is silly to imagine that if we break 
even we are daily suffering a net loss of utility just because money flows out as well 
as in. For any sensible appraisal system to work we need to assume reversibility, ie 
that equal gains and losses cancel. 
 
 
7. Should small time savings have a lower per minute value of time in appraisal? 
 
 Similarly to the case in the previous section, some commentators (eg. Welch and 
Williams, 1997) have suggested that large time savings should be valued more highly 
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per minute than small time savings. In Germany, for instance, this is official 
government policy. It arises from two concerns. Firstly, surveys (particularly SP 
surveys) have had great difficulty in accurately estimating coefficients for small time 
savings, and the per minute values of those that are estimated are usually clearly 
below those for larger time savings. Secondly, it is clearly not so easy to find a highly 
productive use for a small amount of time that is saved for one reason or another. 
Looking at that last point the other way round, if travellers are assumed to generally 
have some slack time in their travelling schedules, a small time loss will have little 
adverse impact on their activities. 
 
 There are many counter arguments and explanations for the above, and only space 
here to briefly rehearse some of them. Firstly, it should be stated loudly that there is 
no agreement as to how small a time saving has to be to be “small”. Some 
commentators talk of 5 minutes being small. Others think 5 seconds is small. Clearly, 
the ragbag of concerns put forward under this heading are self contradictory. 
Secondly, we should consider how awkward it would be if it were to be implemented 
in appraisal. Larger projects, covering a larger part of some long trips, would be likely 
to capture bigger time savings than a smaller project. This would lead to projects 
being combined, and found to have benefits greater than the sum of the parts. What 
would that imply? It is saying that unless you improve the road from B to C at exactly 
the same time as from A to B then A to C travellers will be worse off (once both 
improvements are completed). If the time savings on each section were 4 minutes, and 
time savings were valued at zero if less than 5 minutes, then carrying out the 
improvements independently would give zero benefits while completing them both 
together would give 8 minutes benefit to each traveller. What nonsense. 
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 We each receive a myriad of time savings and losses each day, and it is no wonder 
that, when asked, we cannot say what we did with each saving or how we coped with 
each loss. Not noticing a small time change does not mean it has zero value any more 
than for a small change in accident risk.  
 
 Mathematically, if there is a threshold below which time savings have no value, then 
we must be doing nothing with them and have that amount of time available for 
combining with other small time savings (or losses) as they occur. Eventually, we will 
be pushed over the threshold and have a usable amount of time. Consider chickens 
laying eggs that have to be boxed in sets of 6 for sale daily. The chickens do not know 
this, and produce a Uniformly distributed number of eggs each day. What is the value 
of an extra egg? We could say “zero”, since without another 5 we cannot sell it. But 
we might (on a one in 6 chance) have exactly 5 eggs left over from that day‟s 
production, and so now be able to sell 6 eggs. So 5 out of 6 times the extra egg is 
worth nothing, but once in 6 times it is worth 6 eggs. On average that means that an 
extra egg is worth one sixth of a pack of 6 eggs. Mathematically, this “threshold 
effect” means that in the long run we should value all eggs (and minutes of time) 
equally, no matter how many arrive at once. 
 
 As if that were not persuasive enough, we should remember that our appraisals are 
over many years (in the UK, 60). Any scheme we are evaluating will be helping 
travellers for all that time. What matters for a traveller in 50 years time are the travel 
times in 50 years time, not whether they have come about through a lot of small 
improvements or one large one. Similarly, it does not matter whether there have been 
“gains” and “losses” along the way. The traveller in 50 years time will know nothing 
of travel conditions prior to the scheme or in most of the decades between. All they 
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will be concerned about are travel conditions then. Fowkes (1999) develops these 
points. 
 
 
8. Valuing time saved in the course of work 
 
 Everything that has been said in the preceding sections applies equally to time saved 
while travelling on behalf of an employer. If the employer saves an hour‟s time (every 
day) by abolishing tea breaks, then the employer gains an hour‟s extra output but the 
employees will lose utility from no longer having the breaks. Exactly the same applies 
if the time saving arises from journey time reductions. For those whose work is 
“travel”, for example bus drivers, the position is simple, and a one hour time saving is 
valued at the gross wage payable to that employee.  
 
 For “Briefcase Travellers”, ie those employees travelling to business meetings etc, a 
more detailed treatment has been felt to be justified. The Hensher Equation (see 
Carruthers and Hensher, 1976, Hensher, 1977)  is generally accepted as describing the 
situation: 
 
 VBTT   =   (1 – r  – pq) MP   +   (l – r) VW   + r VL   +   MPF             (30) 
 
 where 
 VBTT =  value of savings in business travel time 
 MP =  Marginal Product of labour 
            MPF =  value of extra output generated due to reduced (travel) fatigue 
            VL =  the value to the employee of leisure time relative to travel time 
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            VW= the value to the employee of time at the workplace relative to travel  time 
            r =  proportion of travel time saved used for leisure purposes 
            p =  proportion of travel time saved at the expense of work done while travelling 
           q =  relative productivity of work done while travelling compared to the office 
 
  In eqn (30) the “MP” term is contentious, since a journey time saving might yield 
some very productive extra time at the destination. Consider a firm conducting 
recruitment interviews at a location 200 miles from head office. Within the agreed 
working day each interviewer might only get 2 hours at the destination, so 6 hours of 
interviews will need 3 trips or 3 interviewers. If the journey time were reduced by 30 
minutes each way then only 2 trips (or interviewers) would be needed, giving a saving 
much greater than one hour‟s wages. 
 
 Considering the “r” term, it must be a very odd firm where that is not zero. The need 
to travel to and from business meetings out of normal working hours must (according 
to economic theory) be taken into account when fixing remuneration, so any lessening 
of travel outside work hours will inexorably lead to wage reductions to exactly 
compensate. Conversely, those travelling more outside working hours will put in for a 
bonus. Many such travellers will effectively be working flexi-time anyway, so time 
can automatically be taken off in lieu in work journey times stretch beyond normal 
working hours. 
 
 The “pq” term has been the subject of much recent interest as it has been alleged that 
the possibilities for working while travelling, on trains at least, have greatly increased 
with wifi availability. However, it is not whether business travellers work on train or 
plane that is important, it is whether a reduction in in-vehicle journey times would 
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cause them to work less.  For long distance rail travel, pq might be as high as 0.2, but 
it is hard to see it being higher. For rail as a whole, an upper limit of 0.1 would seem 
sensible, given that much rail travel (even by “briefcase travellers”) is for short 
distances in urban areas, but that is little more than a guess. For car, pq = 0 is a 
sensible assumption.  
 
 
 The “MPF” term is usually ignored, for want of data. The “VL” term is 
straightforward, being the standard VTTS from eqn. (10).  The “VW” term has proved 
to be the most misunderstood. It is the value to the employee of switching time spent 
at work to time spent travelling on work purposes. Nobody has provided any evidence 
to show that VW is not zero on average. Some employees may welcome some time 
out of the office, while others will prefer the cosy office over the travelling 
environment. 
 
 Mathematically, in terms of the treatment in section 2, we have a new constraint: 
 
 t1  +  t2  =  E                   (31) 
  
 This says that time savings/losses are swapped with work time exactly. We then 
amend our previous Lagrangian, L, to L*, where 
 
 L*  =  L  +  γ( E – t1 – t2) 
 
 The only two conditions to change are (3) and (4) which now become: 
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1t
L


  =  
1t
U


  -  µ  +  θ  -  γ   =  0                        (32) 
 
 
2t
L


  =  
2t
U


  +  λw  -  µ  -  γ  =  0              (33) 
 
 From (32) and (33) we can find the relation between the marginal utility of time spent 
working (t1) and time spent travelling (t2) as: 
 VW  =  
1t
U


  -   
2t
U


  =   λw  -  θ              (34) 
 
 This says that, having adjusted work hours so that the utility of extra leisure time just 
equalled the utility of wages (λw), the only gain/loss to the employee occurs to the 
extent that θ, the disutility of travelling (in the course of work), differs from the utility 
of wages. The simplest course is to say, on average, VW = 0, ie. you get paid to do 
your employer‟s bidding, whether in the office or out travelling. 
 
 
 9. Conclusion 
 
 This quick trip through the topic of valuing travel time savings has theoretically 
derived the accepted interpretation, and looked at several ancillary matters. Much 
attention was given to where and how to use Equity VoTs, but I should emphacise 
that these are only used because it is perceived to be impracticable to individually 
weight all costs and benefits (including money payments) according to the utility 
functions of all those affected by the scheme. Other matters covered were the 
treatment of gains and losses, small time savings, and time savings in the course of 
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work. These are all currently „hot topics‟ amongst transport professionals around the 
world. It is hoped that the present contribution will help clarify thinking on these 
matters. 
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